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CRITICAL CHOICES OF RUSSIA'S DEMOCRACY
by Svetlana A. Chervonnaya*
Winds of change are sweeping across the land known for seventy-four years as
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). The umbilical cord has finally been
cut. The newborn nation-states face critical choices about nation-building and, more
specifically, about developing constitutions and economies.
Painfully shedding the vestiges of imperial heritage, the people of Russia must
choose between democracy and authoritarianism. Six years ago the U.S.S.R. proclaimed
its desire to return to the mainstream of civilization, rejecting its totalitarian past and
launching a chain reaction of democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe. This promise of
a new democratic world is still far from being realized in Russia. In the midst of
economic chaos, political disintegration, and ethnic strife, there is a growing popular
sentiment that this turmoil is the price to be paid for the freedom of expression brought
by Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika. This freedom and value of openness are
increasingly viewed as benefitting only the intellectual elite with no practical benefit for
the "man on the street."
Why has democracy not become as indispensable as bread and potatoes? Is it not
evident that Stalinist genocide, Brezhnev's morass, and the present inability to effectively
use Russia's vast resources are all attributable to the absence of democracy?
Though democracy is as necessary as fresh air, it is evident that Russian society
is not ready for the highly developed forms of democracy. Despite declarations to the
contrary, no real democratic power, where power is based on respect for the individual
and rule of law, has yet emerged in Russia as a result of communist opposition. In some
republics this opposition emerged on the wave of pure nationalism, and in others it grew
on the wave of populism. Everywhere, however, even the most zealous democrats ignore
some of the elemental notions of human rights and the existing laws.
This disparity between the words and the deeds of the new Russian democratic
leadership reveals that six years of attempted democratic reform have not achieved the
expected results. Democratic reform is hampered not only by the stubborn resistance of
the entrenched bureaucracy, but also by the underlying absence of democratic patterns of
thinking, attitudes, and behavior. It is difficult to comprehend how alien such notions as
"natural law," "inalienable rights," "personal sovereignty," and "privacy" appear to
the Russian public consciousness without understanding some of the tragic features of
Russian history.
What were the historical obstacles to the emergence of sound democratic traditions?
What circumstances formed the features and attitudes that still stand in the way of democratic
development? In our quest for answers to modem problems, it is necessary to turn to Russia's
torturous history, which continues to punish us for forgetting its lessons.
I. "YAZ CHLOP Tvoy" ["I AM YOUR SLAVE"]
The basic problem in establishing a democracy is determining the relationship
between an individual and the authorities, between a citizen and the state. Russia has
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always prioritized the state above the individual. It is difficult to understand the crux of
the choices now facing Russia without understanding this fundamental tradition. In this
sense, the burden on Russia, its law, and public morale is too great.
One of the first European travelers to Russia was Sigizmund Gerberstein, the
Hapsburg Empire's ambassador who visited in 1517 and 1526. In his letter to Emperor
Ferdinand, Gerberstein wrote about the "northern country" where "[t]he power that he
[Tsar Basil III] has over his subjects is far greater than the power of all the monarchs of
the world .... Everybody suffers under an equal burden of vicious slavery."' Gerberstein
was surprised to learn that "everybody call[s] themselves chlopi - that is slaves of the
sovereign .... These people find much more pleasure in slavery than in freedom." 2 The
relationship between the Russian monarch and his subjects differed greatly from the
European feudal system in which the power of the monarchy was limited by granting
certain rights and privileges to a variety of social strata.
One of the most important influences in the formation of the Russian sovereign-
subject relationship was the Tatar-Mongol occupation of northeastern Russian lands from
the early thirteenth century to the end of the fifteenth century. The Tatar-Mongol yoke
turned the Russian dukes into the vassals of Mongol khans, creating generations of
subservient rulers. In becoming the khan's servants, the Russian dukes could not avoid
being influenced by the rigid ethic of subordination and submissiveness that permeated
the Mongol society. Under the khans, the Russian dukes did not enjoy even the limited
privileges their own men-at-arms experienced before the occupation.
The substantial destruction of Russia's ruling class during the Mongol invasion
also affected Russia's future social and political development. The differences between
the Russian nobility that emerged from the rigid structure of the Mongols and its
European counterparts partially resulted from the lack of legal guarantees of their rights
and privileges. The Russian nobility never experienced the Western-European "pledge of
faith" system which included a general assembly and accountable functionaries. Even
their name, "dvoryane," deriving from the word "dvor," or court, referred to an
obligation of service and subjugation. The European names for the feudal class, nobility,
gentry, barons, and seniors did not connote servitude. A chain reaction of subservient
psychology made the peasants even more subservient than their masters.
The Mongols also restricted the already limited liberties that Russian towns
enjoyed before the invasion. The freedoms and privileges achieved by European towns as
far back as the twelfth century remained unknown to their Russian counterparts.
More than two centuries after the Mongol invasion, the deep changes in the
internal structure of the ruling class were expressed in the standard address of the feudals
to their suzerain, "I am your slave." The emergence of this address during the reign of
Ivan III, the first Russian monarch to take the tsar's title, marked the final triumph of the
slavish monarch-servant relationship in the northeastern part of Russia. This victory was
linked to the success of the centralizationist policy pursued by the Moscow grand dukes.
The grand dukes unified the Russian lands around Moscow, preserving the special brand
of feudal relationship taking shape in northeastern Russian lands. The despotic features
of the Moscow sovereigns took root in the special character of accelerated unification.
The conversion of Russian nobility into slaves, or "cholopi," of the tsarist
autocracy was completed in the second half of the sixteenth century during the reign of
Ivan IV, also known as Ivan the Terrible. Convinced that the only moral and Christian
SIGIZMUND GERBERSTEIN, ZAPISKI 0 MOSKOVSKIH DELAH, ROSSIA XV-XVtI W. GLAZAMI
INOSTRANTSEV [NOTES ABOUT Moscow AFFAIRS, RUSSIA OF XV-XVII CENTURIES THROUGH THE EYES OF
THE FOREIGNERS] 32, 51-2 (1986).
2 Id.
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duty of his subjects was in service to the tsar, Ivan IV did not concern himself with the
notions of caring for the welfare of his subjects and his country as a whole.
The deep-rooted tendency to identify the person of the autocrat with state power
reached its climax during the reign of the great Russian reformer Peter 1 (1697 to 1725).
European thinkers of this era envisioned the state as a purely human establishment subject
to change at man's discretion. Peter I took these ideas and molded them to serve his own
purposes. His idea of the state as an ideal instrument of social transformation required the
strengthening of various forms of patronage over society, expanding the role of the state
in governing the nation and its people.
The tsar-reformer treated the state as a navy vessel and its agencies as military
units. The state took on a police-like character through organization of a "regular" life
for its subjects. This change started with an authorized draft for construction of houses
and finished with thorough control over the moral and spiritual lives of the people.
The lives of the subjects of this "regular" state were controlled by government
imposed limitations. Peter I introduced a passport system which curtailed the people's
mobility. Neither peasant nor town-dweller could leave his place of residence without a
passport. Violating the passport regime by losing the passport, using it after it had expired,
or traveling beyond allowed territorial limits were criminal offenses for which one was
arrested and deported to his place of residence. People had limited social mobility and
choice of occupation. The state intruded into the affairs of the church and the realm of
religious faith. The church was widely used for police functions - everyone was required
to attend church and confession or be subjected to enormous fines. Likewise, the clergy
were compelled to report all misdeeds learned through confession. The church was
transformed into a bureaucratic office which safeguarded the interests of the autocratic
regime and deprived the people of a spiritual outlet free of government influence.
While European thinkers propounded political theories based on "public treaty"
and "natural law," the principal theoretician of Peter's autocracy, Pheophan Prokopovich,
worked to justify the power of one person over millions of subjects. He rationalized the
right of an autocrat to command with unlimited authority through his peculiar interpreta-
tion of natural and divine law. Russian pre-revolutionary historian Vasily Kluchevsky
recognized in Peter's reformatory epoch "a simultaneous effect of despotism and freedom,
enlightenment and slavery," and called it "an enigma that has been resolving for two
centuries and still has not found its resolution." 3
Half a century later, the enlightened tsarina Catherine 11 (1726-1796) relied on
the theories of natural rights and popular sovereignty in proffering the autocratic
monarchy as the best form of government. She believed the sovereign was the source of
state and civic authority, and her supreme task was providing for the interests and natural
rights of her subjects, Under her political formula, the achievement of the common good
resulted in the achievement of the individual good. She argued that "[t]he aim and end
of the autocratic government is the glory of its subjects, the state and the autocrat
himself."4 In her view, the real welfare could be achieved only if everyone subjugated
himself to the state's supreme authority. No one could limit the sovereign, and its subjects
could not dare to "disdain the sovereign's orders without fear of punishment." 5
4 VASILY 0. KLUCHEVSKY, SOCHINENIA v DEVIATI TOMAKH [WORKS IN NINE VOLUMES] 203
(1989).
4 Nakaz Eya Imperatorskogo Velichestva Ekateriny Vtorya Samoderdzytsy Vserossiyskoy Dannuy
Comissii 0 Sochinenii Proekta Novago Ulodzeniya [Direction of Her Imperial Majesty Catherine II
Sovereign of all Russia to the Commission Preparing New Statute Draft] 5 (1893).
5 id.
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In 1791, Polish politicians authored the world's second written national
constitution, echoing the Americans' claim that" [g]overnments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." 6 Catherine II, who for
years had corresponded with the greatest French thinkers in an attempt to present herself
to the world as an "enlightened" tsarina, perceived the Polish experiment as a threat. The
Russian invasion of Poland in 1792 destroyed the constitutional plan before it could be
implemented.
Why could Catherine's Russia not follow the road mapped by the enlightened
thinkers? Peter Chaadaev, a Russian thinker of the first half of the nineteenth century,
commented that "[t]alking about Russia, people constantly think that they are talking
about a nation like all others; in fact it is far from being true. Russia is a whole special
world, subject to the will, desire and fantasy of one person. It is not important whether
he is called Peter or Ivan: in all cases it is tyranny incarnated." 7
Is there some manifest destiny in Russia's historic development? Is Russia's
political future predetermined despite its repeated attempts to join the mainstream of
Western civilization? Adopting a Marxist view of history as a continuous tunnel does not
inspire great optimism for the future of Russia's democracy. Perhaps a more hopeful view
is that the historical road has a number of interlacing paths. History suggests that a
country has the recurring choice of abandoning a given path and beginning another. This
is the case with respect to the history of Russia.
II. SIX CHANCES LOST
We have already discussed the deep impact of the Tatar-Mongol invasion upon
the socio-political development of the Russian lands. Another factor to consider is the
unification of the eastern Slavic lands during the fourteenth through the sixteenth
centuries. These lands were unified around their northeastern center and became the cradle
of the servant-like relationship between the sovereign and his subjects. This type of
unification and the victory of the servant-like relationship, however, was not predeter-
mined.
Until the middle of the sixteenth century, there remained a possibility of
territorial unification under the political program of the Great Dukedom of Lithuania and
Russia which incorporated the western and southern Slavic lands. For several centuries,
this state was a home not only to Lithuanians, but also to Russians, Ukrainians, and
Byelorussians. This state offered a different development path for eastern Slavic people,
one in which the authority of the sovereign was considerably limited by representative
institutions, with highly developed law and a certain amount of self-government allowed
to the cities. Given another historical layout, the eastern Slavic lands might have
experienced not only the Asiatic despotic regime of Ivan the Terrible, but a multi-national
state governed by a rather effective system of representative institutions.
Similarly, the so-called "Troubled Times" during the end of the sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries can be considered a period of lost opportunity when the chance
for a more favorable mode of development was not realized. The period was characterized
by internal revolts, foreign intervention, and the disintegration of the old power structures.
In 1611, Duke Vasily Shuysky occupied the previously vacant Russian throne.
The Duke was the first to be elected to the throne when the highest nobility of the country
voted him into power. Ascending to the throne, Shuysky swore to his subjects by making
a "record," secured by kissing the cross. It was the first treaty of a tsar with his subjects.
6 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
" PETER CHAADAEV, STATII I' PIS'MA [ARTICLES AND LETrERS] 369 (1989).
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Historian Vasily Kluchevsky wrote that "out of the sovereign of the cholopi, Vasily
Shuysky was turning into a lawful tsar of his subjects, ruling according to laws." '
Shuysky's "record" was the first hesitant step towards a state ruled by law. His political
failure signified another lost opportunity, and the path of the rule of law state was
forgotten for a very long time.
The concept of the rule of law state reemerged two centuries later when Emperor
Alexander I initiated plans to transform Russia's political structure. Europe strove to limit
autocratic power by constitution, and the first results were rather promising. In 1815, a
constitutional monarchy was established in France and in some German kingdoms, and
Sweden confirmed its constitution. In the same year, Russia's Alexander I gave a
constitution to the Polish tsardom which became a part of Russia after the victory over
Napoleon. Speaking in Warsaw in 1818 at the opening of the first Polish Parliament,
Alexander I showed his support of the constitutional system by publicly suggesting that
a constitutional system be introduced in Russia.9
In less than a year, work on drafting a Russian constitution started with great
secrecy. A general review of the 1820 model reveals that the Russian constitution was the
most conservative constitution of its time. Russia was to be a federation divided into
vicegerencies with two-chamber parliaments. However, the fundamental principle of the
American and European constitutions, the sovereignty of the people, was replaced by the
sovereignty of the emperor as "the only source of all civilian, political, legislative and
military authorities."'' 0 Despite the establishment of a two-chamber parliament, the
legislative initiative belonged only to the emperor, who was also the chief executive. A
special article proclaimed civil liberties but denied them to the peasant serfs. The draft and
accompanying manifestos were finished in 1820, but neither the manifestos nor the
constitution were ever enacted.
Why was an autocratic power with its mighty bureaucratic machine unable to
carry out an act which it considered vitally necessary? By enacting the constitution, the
autocracy would have stopped being an autocracy. Involving society in governance and
sharing the tsar's powers was an obstacle neither Alexander I nor his successors could
overcome.
The idea of limiting autocratic power by a constitution was revived in the early
1880s as a logical continuation of reforms after the 1861 peasant emancipation. The
Russian "perestroika" of 1861-1874 produced a constitutional model that provided for
local elected representative bodies (zemstvo); city municipal governments; independent,
impartial, public courts; an independent bar; and trial by jury. The model also reformed
the educational system, censorship regulations, the military, and government spending.
On the morning of March 1, 1881, Tsar Alexander II appeared ready to approve
the constitutional draft prepared by his Minister, M. Loris-Melikov. That afternoon,
however, he was assassinated by revolutionary terrorists. With his death, the liberal
reformist policy also perished.
The counterreforms that followed the assassination are testimony to the tenacity
of autocratic political culture. On March 8, 1881, the Council of Ministers buried Loris-
Melikov's constitution. On April 29, 1881, the new tsar issued a manifesto entitled "On
83 KLUCHEVSKY, supra note 3, at 37.
9 Sergey V. Mironenko, Kak Rossia v Nachale XIX Veka Chut Ne Stala Konstitutsionnoy Monarkiey
[How Russia in the Early 19th Century Had Almost Become a Constituitional Monarchy], in ISTORIA
OTECHESTVA: LUDI, IDEI, RESHENIYA [HISTORY OF THE NATIVE LAND: PEOPLE, IDEAS, DECISIONS]
[hereinafter HISTORY OF THE NATIVE LAND] 254, 265 (1991).
'0 Id. at 267.
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Immovability of Autocracy." ' ' On August 14, 1881, the tsar approved the "Provisions
for Measures for Safeguarding the National Security and Public Order," which allowed
a state of emergency to be declared in any territory. Any person residing in that territory
could be arrested, subjected to a five-year exile without trial, or brought before a court
martial. The local administration was given broad powers to close schools and businesses
and to suspend the press.' 2 This "temporary" provision remained in effect until 1917.
The revolution of 1905-1907 raised the issue of constitutional development for
the fifth time. The constitutionalism grown on the Russian autocratic soil was much more
limited than that of the West. The constitution's proponents strove to limit the tsar's
authority, establish representative institutions, and proclaim democratic rights and liberties.
In the words of Prime Minister S. Vitte, the pressure of the popular revolution
forced the autocracy to "step on the road of concessions to the public opinion ... [that
is] on the constitutional road of development."' 3 On October 17, 1905, a manifesto was
published that granted the people of Russia "the basics of civil freedom" with the
accompanying civil liberties and the first legislative institution, the State Duma. Thus, an
absurd and unprecedented structure, the "constitutional autocracy," was created. 4
Political parties promptly emerged to participate in the 1906 elections to the
State Duma. The majority of the seats were won by leftist parties and groups. The
liberals concluded that Russia was not far from achieving a normal constitutional
development. The government, on the other hand, appointed by the tsar and
responsible solely to him, was determined to curtail the activity of the first
popularly-elected legislators. The first seventy-two days of Russia's parliament were
a bitter duel between the legislative and executive powers, ending with the Duma's
defeat. The government made no attempt to give this act a semblance of legality.
Arriving for their morning session, the deputies discovered that the gates were
locked and stamped with the tsar's order that the Duma be dissolved. The official
explanation cited the deputies' attempts to investigate the actions of the central and
local government and their "criticism of the existing laws.'" 5
Thus, the first struggle for parliamentarianism failed, and the autocratic regime
remained unshattered. Article 4 of the Basic Laws of the Russian Empire passed in 1906
said, "The supreme autocratic authority is vested in the Emperor of Russia.' ' 16 He
understood that "Russia has outgrown the existing governmental structure and strives
towards the rule-of-law structure based on the civil liberty."' 7 The three State Dumas
that followed were elected through severely limited election laws and only served to give
the government a semblance of constitutionalism.
0 Nezyblemosti Samoderdgaviya, Manifest Gosudarya Imperatora Vseya Rusi Alexandra III ot 29
Aprelya 1881 [On Immovability of Autocracy, Manifesto of his Majesty Emperor of All Russia Alexander
III of April 29, 1881] reprinted in HISTORY OF THE NATIVE LAND 323 (1991).
2 Polodgenie o Merah k Sohraneniyu Gosudcerstvennoy Vezopasnosti i Obtshestvennogo
Spokoystviya ot 14 Avgusta 1881" [Provisions for Measures for Safeguarding National Security and Public
Order, Adopted Aug. 14, 1881], reprinted in HISTORY OF THE NATIVE LAND 323 (1991).
13 3 SERGEY J. VITTE, VOSPOMINANIYA [MEMOIRS] 5 (1960).
14 Konstantin F. Shatsillo, Nickolai II: Reformy iii Revolutsiya? [Nicholai I/: Reforms or Revolution?],
in HISTORY OF THE NATIVE LAND 357 (1991).
15 21 MICHAEL GLAZUNOV & BORIS MITROFANOV, SUD'BA PERVOGO PARLAMENTA RossII:
"SOVETSKAYA JUSTITSIYA" [THE FATE OF THE FIRST RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT: "SOVIET JUSTICE"] 22-24
(1989).
16 SVOD OSNOVNYH GOSUDARSTVENNYH ZAKONOV (IZDANIE 1906 GODA) [CODE OF THE BASIC
LAWS OF THE STATE (PUBLICATION OF 1906)], art. 4, reprinted in I SVOD ZAKONOV ROSSIYSKOY IMPERIl
[CODE OF LAWS OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE], Book 1, (A.A. Dobrovolski ed., 1913).
17 id.
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When the autocracy failed to evolve into a constitutional monarchy, the people
reacted. In February 1917, the 300-year old Romanov dynasty was destroyed by popular
democratic revolution.
The tragedy for Russian democracy was in the timing; Russia was exhausted after
three years of fighting an unpopular war. Several opportunities for the establishment of
Russian democracy occurred in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If the
democracy had been successfully established, it would have gained experience, developed
an elaborate agenda, produced mature leaders, and nurtured democratic habits in its
people. However, history did not let an exhausted Russia acquire even a minimal amount
of freedom. Eight months of existence did not give Russian democracy sufficient time to
gain experience and produce necessary human potential. Overnight, democracy fell at the
first blow of the Bolsheviks.
The October 1917 coup should not be viewed as a logical conclusion to the
February democratic revolution. Quite to the contrary, it was an anti-democratic
counterrevolution dispensing with the first light of freedom. Having dissolved the
popularly elected Constituent Assembly in January 1918, the Bolsheviks restored
unlimited power to the power-holders and the absolute servility of their subjects. Russia's
history of tsarist autocracy simplified the Bolsheviks' task of labeling the most basic
rights and liberties as "bourgeois prejudices" and of establishing a repressive totalitarian
regime.
III. SUBJECT OR CITIZEN?
The essential difference between a subject and a citizen enabled the Bolsheviks
to stamp out the feeble democracy. A subject is responsible to the state, serves it, and
obeys its orders. A citizen is responsible to himself and to the nation, not to whatever
administration happens to be in power. To a subject, the state is an irrational, external
force. To a citizen, the state is an understandable mechanism used to administer the
country, established with the citizen's active participation and operating under the citizen's
control. A subject depends upon the state for the satisfaction of basic needs and is
expected to feel grateful for the very right of existence. A citizen provides for personal
needs and, in exchange for benefits from the state, relinquishes some rights.
Throughout history, Russians have been deprived of any real sense of citizenship,
and thus an understanding of the inalienable nature of their rights. Despite this lack of
understanding of citizenship, there have been great Russian citizens such as nineteenth
century thinkers Peter Chaadaev, Alexander Herzen, and academic Andrei Sakarov. These
citizens demonstrated heroic resistance to tradition, and heroism is a fate of the few.
Citizenship has never become a natural habit in Russia. In Western democracies, civic
values are deeply rooted in the people's subconscious behavioral attitudes. Peter Chaadaev
emphasized this disparity with his comment: "We have to hammer into people's heads
what for other nations has become a habit."' 8 Citizens born in a kingdom of subjects
have always been rejected as dissident and alien.
The personality of the subject is cemented with fear. Until recently, it was the
great state fear, the fear of totalitarian tyranny and ideological oppression. There is hope
that this fear has finally been overcome, but great fear is always surrounded by a host of
smaller fears. One of these fears is the childhood fear of independence. A subject does
not like to remain alone without the elder's supervision and the peer's example. He is a
collectivist not only by his upbringing, but by his fear. A fear of falling out of a group
"S CHAADAEV, supra note 7, at 47.
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or "collective" is a generic fear of a Soviet person. However, the erosion of the
"ideological superstructure" of this fear, the myth of the beneficial power of a collective
and the inherent powerlessness of the individual, has already started giving way to the
hope for a free individual, conscious of his independence.
What are the prerequisites of becoming a citizen? The major prerequisite is
freedom, a space within which a person can function without facing unreasonable
interdictions and regulations. The international community has long defined the
dimensions of this free space based on established standards of human rights.
Memorizing a list of one's inalienable rights does not guarantee an understanding
of those rights. In the United States, this understanding took two centuries to formulate,
even with a background of democratic tradition dating to the Magna Carta. For Russians,
an understanding of the citizen with a simple, clear-cut, and rational relationship with his
country is still incomprehensible. Real-life problems and opportunities are changing this,
however. Will Russians realize the historic chance of finally becoming full and equal
citizens of their country and not the subjects of their state? To a great degree the answer
will depend on Russia's progress toward the rule-of-law state.
IV. RULE OF LAW OR RULE OF FORCE?
As late as 1864, Russia started its movement toward a rule of law state by
undertaking a large-scale judicial reform. In October 1917, the movement was interrupted
for more than seventy years by the Bolsheviks and their rejection of the rule of law as
"bourgeois trash."
By its very nature, Bolshevism is incompatible with the rule of law. The
Bolsheviks used decrees, government decisions, and a constitution to serve propaganda
purposes. These "laws" affirmed the imperativeness of the so-called proletarian power
and legalized the Red Terror. For more than seventy years, the "law of the land" was not
"a law which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial."' 9 Instead,
the law was looked upon as a major weapon of political and class dominance.
In the course of constructing the foundation of the Soviet state, the state's
architects hastily discarded not only the idea of the rule of law but also the entire
concept of constitutionalism which encompasses the rule of law. In place of the
values of constitutionalism, Bolsheviks substituted public property and the
"dictatorship of the proletariat" in the form of an almighty Soviet power. The
socio-political system of the country was made to serve the Bolsheviks' demands.
The system of public administration was based upon the principle of unification of
the legislative and executive powers. The economic system stipulated one "who
doesn't work doesn't eat," and the social system applied the principle of "democra-
cy only for the working and exploited masses."
The Russian experience has demonstrated that mere presence of a constitution
does not bring about rule of law. Since October 1917, more than 100 constitutions and
constitution-type laws have been adopted. None have reflected the will of the people and
thus were declarative. Vladimir Lenin called a constitution "a sheet of paper the rights
of the people are written on." 20 He did not cover the fact that the Bolsheviks "had not
19 DANIEL WEBSTER, Argument in the Dartmouth College Case, in DANIEL WEBSTER READER 131,
131-52 (Bertha M. Rothe ed., 1956).
20 39 VLADIMIR 1. LENIN, Zaklyuchitelnoe Slovo po Dokladu VTslK i Sovnarkoma ot 6 Dekabrja 1917
[Final Remark on the Report of All-Russia Central Executive Committee and Council of People's
Commissars of December 6, 1917], in COLLECTED WORKS 415 (5th ed. 1970).
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promised that the constitution would provide freedom and equality in general. Freedom
- but for which class and for what usage?"'"
Despite its rejection of the principles of constitutional protections, the young
Soviet state failed to develop substitute principles. Given its own doctrine of the primacy
of political expediency over the rule of law, the state was drawn inevitably to totalitarian-
ism.
In the totalitarian system, Soviet constitutions were deprived of legal supremacy
and reduced to an ideological and political function addressed to the subjects of the
political system. The constitutions were viewed as political-legal acts of primarily
propagandistic and educational significance. The dominant view of the law as a political
instrument and accompanying legal nihilism resulted in frequent constitutional reforms.
The declarative character of the Soviet constitutions was most apparent in the
sphere of civil rights and liberties. A major feature of Soviet constitutional provisions for
civil rights and liberties was a definition of the major goals. However, these definitions
limited the realization of civil rights and liberties. For example, the Constitution of the
Russian Federation of 1918, having proclaimed the socialist restructuring of society,
deprived the so-called "exploitative classes" of civil and political rights.22 The
Constitution of 1936, officially touted as a "constitution of victorious socialism,"
possessing all the formal democratic attributes, was in fact designed merely to create a
democratic image for the totalitarian-repressive regime.23 The Constitution of 1977,24
spearheaded by the desire of the Brezhnev clique to "enter into history," was based on
the myth of creating "developed socialism," or a "people's state" of allegedly achieved
"social progress." This constitution confirmed the principles of "socialist law" and
"socialist law and order," and declared the sovereignty of the people as realized by the
Soviets of People's Deputies. Compared to the Constitution of 1936, the number of
articles devoted to civil rights and liberties had almost doubled. At the same time, the
Constitution of 1977 stated that all those rights and liberties were given only "for the
purpose of strengthening and developing the socialist order ' 25 and "should be used in
accordance with the interests of the people.' ,
2 6
It is noteworthy that no Soviet constitution mentioned such elemental notions of
human rights as the freedom of expression, security from political persecution, or the
observance of religious tolerance. Until 1988, a number of articles of the Republican
Criminal Codes used some of the constitutionally proclaimed liberties as criminal offenses.
Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
(RSFSR) provided a prison term of six months to six years and a two to five year exile
for distributing information detrimental to the "Soviet state and social structure. ' 27 In
the "Commentary" to the Criminal Code published in 1984, "anti-Soviet advocacy and
propaganda" were understood as the "circulation of ideas of an anti-Soviet content
among a more or less broad circle of people . . . without regard to their number.",
28
"Conversations, presentations, reports, demonstrations of anti-Soviet films or cassettes,
hanging bourgeois-nationalist flags, insignias, etc,' were treated as criminal offenses.
21 Id. at 424.
22 KONSTITUTSIIA RSFSR [Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] [KONST.
RSFSR] (1918).
23 KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR [Constitution of U.S.S.R.] (1936).
24 KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR [Constitution of U.S.S.R.] (1977).
25 Id. art. 50.
26 Id. art. 51.
27 UGOLOVNYI KODEKS RSFSR [CRIMINAL CODE] [UK RSFSR] art. 70 (1986).
21 UK RSFSR cmt. at 157 (1984).
29 Id. at 158.
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Article 190, part 1, provided a prison term of up to three years for the "systematic
circulation in an oral form of false ideas slanderous to the Soviet state and social
structure. ' 3' The Commentary to the Criminal Code, supra, explained that "different
sayings such as information a guilty person made or gave in the presence of other
citizens" with the aim of "giving a negative interpretation to the whole Soviet state and
social order or ... to its separate ... agencies or ... elements," could be interpreted as
such "circulation" and be criminally punishable.3' For many years, these articles served
to repress dissidents and non-conforming minorities.
Also indicative of the declarative character of Soviet constitutions was the lack
of "direct action," legal and political mechanisms for the enforcement of constitutional
principles. A constitutional declaration of the "freedom of conscience" was practically
nullified by an accompanying provision for the "right of atheistic propaganda." 32 All
constitutions of the Soviet period were legally weak; their provisions were not supported
by the necessary legal guarantees or legislation. Any mechanism of constitutional control
was absent. At the same time, the constitutional effect was further limited and distorted
by quasi-legal norms and regulations.
Until 1987, there was no law permitting a private appeal of official government
action. A rather narrow law that did provide for the appeal of the actions of government
agencies and institutions was passed in 1987 but did not go into effect until 1991."3 The
right to compensation for damages caused by unlawful acts of government agencies,
functionaries and public organizations was recognized only recently.34
The Soviet constitution was weakest in the sphere of human rights. The problems
of enforcing and supervising the civil rights provisions are still far from being solved. The
legislation of the period of "perestroika" introducing authorizational instead of
registrational procedure for the realization of political liberties such as freedom of
association, assembly, and peaceful mass protest is incompatible with the very nature of
constitutional liberties.
Constitutions have too often been used as screens for concealing the abuse of
power, the suppression of democracy, and the destruction of the moral fabric of society.
Constitutional norms showing respect for the individual and defending civil rights and
liberties are ignored on a daily basis by the government, public agencies, and their
officials. Bureaucratism still stands in the way of the practical realization of democratic
rights and liberties.
Thus, the Soviet constitution, instead of being a legal document, was merely a
political manifesto used for the political mobilization of the people and as an ideological
justification for the "political line." The constitution also served a super task: to coerce
the populace into approved ways of thinking and living, and to practically outlaw all other
attitudes and lifestyles.
The declarative character of the Soviet constitution is also portrayed through the
absence of "constitutional law" in Soviet law schools, and predominance of the notion
of "state law." For several generations of Soviet-trained lawyers, such notions as
o UK RSFSRart. 190, part 1 (1986).
31 UK RSFSR cmt. at 392-93 (1986).
32 KONSTIT. S.S.S.R. art. 52 (1977).
" Zakon SSSR o Poryadke Obdgalovaniya v Sud Nepravomemyh Deystviy Organov
Gosudarstvennogo Upravleniya y Doldgnostnyh Lits Utshemlyautshyh Prava Gradgdan ot 2 Noyabrya 1989
[The Law of the U.S.S.R. about the Procedure of Judicial Redress of Unlawful Actions of the Government
Institutions and Government Officials Curtailing the Rights of the Citizens of November 2, 1989], reprinted
in IZVESTIIA, Nov. 3, 1989.
3' Articles were added to preexisting laws. See, e.g., The Law on Property in the RSFSR of Dec. 24,
1990, art. 3, §3 and A Law of Damage Compensation for Unlawful Imprisonment of 1991.
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constitutionalism and constitutionally-defended rights are alien. Until the past school year,
the courses in state law, taught instead of constitutional law, stressed the "advantages"
of the "socialist statehood" and the "socialist legal order." Likewise, the only "civics"
course studied in high school is entitled "The Basics of State and Law" and emphasizes
the primacy of the state.
In this situation, the low public image of the Soviet constitution, despite annual
official celebrations of "Constitution Day," is quite understandable. Seventy years of
hollow "constitutionalism" have left a bitter heritage. The Russian people lack
constitutional awareness, a practicable understanding of the autonomy of civic society and
the necessity of limiting state interference in people's lives. They have difficulty in
understanding that human rights are not granted by the state, but are supreme values that
no authority can abridge. Why should the subject of a "socialist" state attempt to
comprehend his inalienable rights when there is no mechanism for the realization of these
rights and the omnipotent state rules by force rather than by law?
Democratic development and the establishment of real freedom and a free market
economy is obstructed by the deep penetration of etatist thinking in Soviet law. One way
to reduce law to a role as a true servant of the totalitarian state is to exclude private law
relationships from the sphere of civil law and substitute public law relationships. We
cannot underestimate the importance of Lenin's attitudes in destroying the highly-
developed civil law culture existing in Russia before the October Revolution. In drafting
the Soviet Civil Code in 1921, Lenin secured the state's intervention into the sphere of
civil laws, "We don't recognize anything 'private.' For us everything in the economic life
belongs to the sphere of the public and not private law. ' 35 Lenin's words served for
decades as a general and indisputable directive.
Private law, reflecting a certain legal order based upon a firm foundation of
freedom and natural, inalienable, individual rights was alien to a state that declared war
on everything "private." The dominance of public law principles resulted in a deep-
rooted notion that the state and its laws are the only source of all legal relationships, with
a judge as a government instrument defending state interests.
Can the existing corps of judges, accustomed to considering themselves
instruments of the state, serve as the highest authority in all conflicts and as a substantial
counterforce to the legislative and executive branches? In a society still reducing the law
to criminal punishment and administrative control, only the fundamental dismantling of
the existing public law stereotypes will restore law to its rightful place.
V. EQUALITY IN SLAVERY OR INEQUALITY IN FREEDOM
Probably the greatest misfortunes and failures of twentieth century Russia
precipitated from the idea of equality in its Bolshevik realization. The Marxian social
utopian ideal was attractive to a peasant country that until the second half of the
nineteenth century had not known private peasant land ownership and, hence, was
unhampered by a deep-rooted understanding of the inalienable character of individual
rights and liberties that accomplishes property ownership. The trend of social thinking was
toward strong idealism with a pronounced desire for social justice and equality.
This idealistic public consciousness served as a fruitful soil for the vulgar
Bolshevik understanding of equality as a leveling to be achieved through the forcible
redistribution of power and wealth according to the principle "those who were nothing
would become everything," an attractive formula for the dispossessed masses.
35 44 LENIN, supra note 20, at 396-98.
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The realization of this formula on one sixth part of the Earth demonstrated the
greatest temptation of the idea of equality. If thought of not as liberal "equality of
opportunity" but as a socialist "outcome equality," it may place people in a situation of
a terrible alternative: either equality or freedom. Unconstrained human activity, be it
manual or intellectual labor, business or art, inevitably brings social differentiation and
income division. The natural inequality of human talents and capacities makes any attempt
at social and income leveling result in limitations on human freedom. Our experience
proved that leveling is incompatible with individual freedom. Freedom finds itself behind
the bars of inequality.
The choice between freedom and equality has been recognized throughout
history. Its reflection can be found in the Biblical parable of bread turned to stone.36
Early in this century,.the choice was formulated by the great Russian thinker Nickolai
Berdyaev, "Freedom is the right for an inequality.""
Unfortunately, Russia's contemporary history confirmed Alexis de Tocqueville's
warning of a perverted inclination toward equality when the weakest desire to downgrade
the strongest, when people "call for equality in slavery," and when they cannot obtain
"equality in freedom. ' 38 Among the "evils that extreme equality may produce," de
Tocqueville recognized "poverty, servitude, [and] barbarism."
39
The Bolsheviks unleashed the people's instinct to demand equality before
anything else. The impoverished masses were inspired by the Bolshevik slogan, "rob what
has been robbed," instead of beginning the prosaic work of reconstructing a country
destroyed by war. They divided wealth accumulated by the "exploitative classes," a
category not limited to landowners, clergy, and capitalists but randomly augmented with
representatives of the middle class. It is this preoccupation with social equality that
resulted in the unprecedented destruction of the nation's economy.
Ten years later, Stalin exploited this preoccupation with social equality by
forcibly eliminating individual farming efforts through use of the seemingly appealing
principle of "collectivization" of agriculture. The destruction of individual farming and
physical annihilation of farmers repeatedly brought large-scale famines. Official efforts
to establish price ceilings and maximum wages, ignoring educational and skill differences,
subjected the people to semi-poverty. This leveling blocked the realization of Russian
human potential as well as its spiritual and physical talents. Russia's pre-revolutionary
statesman Peter Stolypin's warning that one can level only to the lowest level proved
prophetic.40
The facelessness of total leveling was ideal for the Soviet power holders.
Cleverly supported semi-poverty was easier to manage and manipulate through guards and
watchmen disguised as "beneficiaries of the people" than was a society of free and
independent individuals capable of providing for their own needs. In the West, one's
merits, efforts, and welfare were interrelated. Soviet people, by contrast, learned from
kindergarten that wealth was criminal and poverty was honorable. For decades, the leaders
encouraged the popular scorn of those who by virtue of talent, hard work, or inspiration
were "grabbing money." Generations of people were constantly scared by wealth,
inequality, and the allegedly accompanying "exploitation of one person by another." The
36 Matthew 7:11-18.
" NIKOLAI A. BERDYAEV, PHILOSOPHIYA NERAVENSTVA [PHILOSOPHY OF INEQUALITY] 170 (1990).
38 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 101-103 (Henry Reeve & Francis Bowen
trans., Phillips Bradley ed., 1945).
'9 Id. at 103.
40 See e.g., PETER A. STOLYPIN, NAM NUZSHOA VELIKAYA ROSSIA [WE NEED A GREAT RUSSIA]
(1991).
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inevitable result was the formation of a people who were psychological lumpen,
suspicious of any person emerging from the monolithic ranks ready and able to work.
Multitudes of lumpen automatically tried to dump any upstarts into the morass of faceless
"equality."
In the recent past, these people enviously counted up the earnings of their
neighbors and their savings account sums, wasting energy to expose those living on
unearned income. The populace suspected not only the corrupt employees of the state-
owned retail trade network, but also prominent scholars, writers, artists, and entertainers.
Any person whose lifestyle did not conform to the officially imposed and popularly
accepted standards was a target.
Today this lumpenized consciousness picks its enemies from the emergent class
of business people who arose from the socialist leveling to reap the first fruits of
economic freedom. Having obtained this freedom, an individual no longer needs the
support of the compulsory "just distribution" of meager social benefits. All one needs
are established fair rules of the game to provide equal opportunities. The failure of this
seventy-four year long experiment in outcome equality clearly manifests the impasse that
results if the laudable concept of justice is carried to the extreme of economic outcome
equality for everyone.
VI. NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY OF THE INDIVIDUAL?
As struggles for national determination tear apart what used to be the Soviet
Union, very few ask whether the realization of ethnonational ambitions correlate with the
obligation of a civic society to protect the rights and liberties of its citizens. The term
"pluralism," a recently popular term, has been given only political and cultural
interpretation. Few understand that pluralistic political and cultural thinking should have
an ethnic counterpart that guarantees the rights of minorities.
Several decades ago, the official Soviet propaganda declared that the nationalities
problem in the U.S.S.R. had been finally and completely settled. Claiming the "triumph
of the Leninist theory of nations and national relations," Soviet leaders tried to judge, and
often teach, other nations and peoples, arrogantly disregarding other international
experiences with inter-ethnic and minority relations. For decades, Soviets zealously
criticized the American approach to ethnic problems, focusing on racial animosity and the
remaining social and economic disparity between various racial groups, without
considering underlying principles of American nationhood.
In the wreckage of the Leninist-Stalinist tower of Babylon, one cannot stop
thinking of prophetic wisdom of George Washington and the other Founding Fathers
objecting to the development of the country as a multi-national entity with large ethnic
enclaves (like "New Germany") that could turn into ethnic-territorial entities4 with their
own administrations. The more than 200-year history of the United States has proved the
vitality of a state model based upon the integration of all ethnic and racial elements into
a single nation. In the absence of any form of ethnic sovereignty, ethnic-territorial
structures, or ethnic political representation, individual rights have been prioritized over
group right and ethnic and cultural pluralism.
A fundamental principle of the system Russia inherited was Stalin's definition
of a nation as an ethnically homogenous community with exclusive rights to a territory
with fixed borders. This definition resulted in a rigid hierarchy of ethnic communities with
a corresponding hierarchy of administrative-territorial divisions. The top place in this
41 12 GEORGE WASHINGTON, THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 489 (F. Ford ed., 1989).
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elaborate system belonged to the "nations" entitled to a union republic statehood. The
"second-class" nations were entitled to autonomous republics, and the "third" and
"fourth-class" nations could have autonomous regions and territories. The lowest groups
in the system were left with no statehood or autonomy. This same fate was left for
millions of ethnic group members residing outside their indigenous territories.
In the first twenty years after the October Revolution, a giant territorial
demarcation of the country on an ethnic and often pseudo-ethnic basis was realized. In
the 1940s, this was supplemented with a forced relocation of many ethnic groups. The
U.S.S.R. was broken into fifteen union republics, including three Baltic republics occupied
in 1940. Most of the union republics had four underground floors and several dozen
autonomous republics, regions, districts, and territories.
Some union republics and most autonomies were artificially constructed with
"native" ethnic groups comprising less than half their population. According to the last
population census, the "native peoples" comprised the majority of the population in only
four out of sixteen autonomous republics. 42 Consequently, mono-ethnic autonomies exist
in multi-ethnic territories. Consistent with Lenin's idea of "national self-determination,"
most ethnic groups were allocated "national corners."
The people of the Soviet Union were deliberately separated into these "national
corners." The old Russia's non-ethnic identity, where anyone who defined himself as
"Russian" was considered "Russian," was substituted with a compulsory definition of
"nationality" understood as an ethnic origin. The practice of defining nationality in the
internal passports according to the ethnic origin of one of the parents was unprecedented,
but still exists today. At the age of sixteen, when internal passports are issued, citizens
must define their "nationality." Even those who are uncertain of their nationality must
decide whether they are Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Georgian, or Jewish. In some
cases, as when an individual may have taken in multiple cultures or have adopted the
language and culture of the people, that individual is not associated with by "bonds of
blood."
According to the 1922 Union Treaty, only the nations that had formed their
quasi-sovereign nations in the form of union republics enjoyed the right to national self-
determination.43 These were the subjects of the federation and had direct relations with
federal structures. The more than one hundred nations remaining could only communicate
with the federative bodies through the republican structures. As a result, some groups
became subordinate to others with unequal status of different ethnicities in the federal
structure.
It is bitter to realize that the historic choice made for people living in the territory
of the former Soviet Union had predetermined their ethnic and not socio-political
consolidation. A system of establishing ethnic-territorial nations cannot adequately settle
the problems of a multi-ethnic state, especially in regions where the title group does not
comprise the majority.
The constitutional provision for "national determination" also poses an
unsolvable problem of incompatible and mutually exclusive ethnic loyalties. Against the
background of the difficult legacy of imperial oppression and individual powerlessness,
it is understandable why a "national sovereignty" is seen by many as the only path
42 FINANSY Y STATISTIKA, NATSIONALNY SOSTAV NASELENIYA SSSR [FINANCE AND STATISTICS,
ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R.] 34-49 (1991).
4' Dogovor ob Obrazovanii Soyuza Sovetskih Sotsialisticheskih Respublik [The Treaty of the
Establishment of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics], Dec. 30, 1922, reprinted in OBRAZOvANIE
SOYUZA SOVETSKIH SOTSIALISTICHESKIH RESPUBLIK [THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS] 381-86 (1972).
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toward equality and the solution of social and economic problems. Hence, a national
movement appears to be the most readily available form of action.
Having discarded the myth of the "proletarian state," many people cling to the
myth of the "nation-state," thinking that one ethnic group can serve as the basis of a
nation. It is necessary, however, to mention the basic inaccuracy of the term "nation" as
used by Russian leaders and authors. In Russian, the word "nation" is a combination of
two notions: "ethnicity" as a racial, biological, and cultural unity and "population" as
a political and civic unity. This combination gives ample room for political dirty tricks.
What is the right to "national self-determination?" Is it a right of the entire
population of a country or territory to determine its future democratically, or is it a right
to racial or ethnic separatism? Today the ethnic and racial notions of the word
unfortunately prevail, giving discussions of "national rights" ethno-biological overtones.
Mistaking the self-determination of republics with the self-determination of
ethnicities is one of the most serious failures of the present prevailing approach to solving
the "national problem." It creates an illusion that imperial totalitarian structures can be
dismantled solely through "nation-state" arrangements without resulting in real freedom
for regions, communities, and individuals. The power of the party bureaucracy is thus
replaced with the power of the ethnocracy.
What is the future of ethnonationalism in "nation-states" where the "native"
population constitutes less than a majority? Can the sovereignty of the Tatar Republic be
interpreted as the result of self-determination of the Tatars when eighty percent of its
members reside outside this republic? What will be the price of social peace in the Baltic
republics with the rights of their sizable "non-native" populations, almost forty percent
of Estonia and fifty percent in Latvia, severely abridged? What will happen if the most
alarming Russian ethnonationalism becomes realized so that a "Russian republic" is
created on the territory of the current Russia despite the existence of more than one
hundred ethnic groups? Can a civil society evolve within the limits of ethnic nationhood
when the state becomes a vehicle for just one ethnic group?
The centrifugal forces being unleashed lead us to demand sovereignty rights that
may mean political and national break-up and economic disintegration. Ethnonational
structures may play a positive role in the struggle for sovereignty and the destruction of
imperial structure, but are far from being adequate for the task of building civil society
and securing the rights of its members.
Is there a way out of the destructive maelstrom of "national" problems? Can the
problems be solved by the further expansion of public sovereignty and the further creation
of ethno-territorial entities? Russians have lived too long in the totalitarian wonderland
where the individual was lost in the collective, where class consciousness and Communist
Party affiliation were substitutes for personal and civic responsibility. Although totalitarian
ideology has retreated, the inertial force of collectivism is still sufficiently strong for
ethnonationalism to replace the class and the Party. The degradation of a personality
squeezed into the "national unity" happens even quicker than in the "class unity" or in
the monolithic party ranks. Ethnocracy inevitably works against democracy and social and
economic welfare, finally depriving the people of their civil rights.
The experience accumulated by the international community indicates that the
only escape from this stalemate is the recognition of the primacy of human rights over
ethnic group rights. Any discussion of the rule of law state is futile without recognizing
the limitations superimposed upon the national sovereignty by the inalienable rights of
individuals.
Russia's democracy today faces a hard choice: whether to repeat the dangerous
Soviet experience by solving the explosive national problem with its inevitable conflicting
result or to model Russia's future after a system similar to that of the United States,
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which prioritizes individual rights over structural and group rights, and gives equal rights
and opportunities to all ethnic groups. Can this time-tested self-government of regional
communities ever become the basis of Russia's national structure in place of the ill-fated
ethnically based quasi-federalism? Can the concept of the nation-state finally be combined
with the concept of a democratic government with limited powers, checks and balances,
and an obligation to protect the rights of minorities? Can Russia make this long overdue
decision after its recent and tragic experiences?
VII. AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL?
In the distant autumn of 1921, with the flames of the Civil War still blazing in
faraway Russia, the commander-in-chief of the defeated counter-revolutionary forces,
General Anthon Denikin, wrote in exile: "Out of blood, dirt, spiritual and physical
poverty the Russian people will rise full of energy and reason."44 Through the bitterness
of military defeat and the chaos of fratricidal war, the general finally managed to come
to the same conclusion as philosopher Nicolai Berdyaev who saw the only hope for
Russia in the long and natural process of the "internal overcoming the Bolshevism.
' 45
The realization of this hope took long decades: Its first gleam flashed in the
stifling atmosphere of the late 1960s to early 1970s when the idea of human rights
plunged into spiritual somnolence after the short-lived thaw during the Kruschev
administration. Of course, in discussing the self-generation of the human rights defense
movement in the U.S.S.R., one should not discard such external factors as the Prague
Spring, the Helsinki process, and the efforts of American administrations at turning the
human rights issue into the primary criterion of international politics.
Yet, the idea of human rights was not an imported product. It began with the
actions of individual persons. Then it united a small but socially influential group of
people and quickly became a factor in the life of society. The years of the emergence of
the rights-defense movement were also the years of an emerging legal consciousness.
Taking the stand for human rights inevitably meant coming into conflict with the system.
Each new political arrest, trial, and exile, and each new official campaign against
dissidents opened the eyes of more and more people, making them question the very
foundations of the system.
One cannot say that the rights-defense movement, ruthlessly suppressed by the
Soviet apparatus, was a strange seed brought by the foreign wind, if a decade later this
seed had sprouted on the seemingly barren soil of the Communist Party nomenclature
itself. The perestroika begun by Mikhail Gorbachev started the process of the "internal
overcoming of Bolshevism" whose development inevitably broke down Communist
ideology and Communist regimes around the world.
From our short rights-defense history, one can marvel at the speed with which,
beginning in 1989, the freedom of expression and the press, the right to assembly, free
elections, political pluralism, the freedom to leave one's own country, and some due
process protections took root in the barren soil of the totalitarian state. The task is to
prevent the political battles that shake the nation from destroying this new consciousness,
and to allow this consciousness to strengthen so that the understanding of the inalienable
" Anton I. Denikin, Ocherki Russkoy Smuty: Krushenie Vlasti y Armii: Fevral' - Sentyabr' 1917
[Essays on the Russian Turmoil: The Collapse of Power and the Army: February-September 1917], in I
OCHERKI RusSKOW SMUTY [ESSAYS ON THE RUSSIAN TURMOIL] 120-21 n.3 (1990).
45 See, e.g., NICKOLAI A. BEZDYAEV, ISTOKI Y SMYSL RUSSKOGo KOMMUNISMA [THE SOURCES AND
IDEA OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISM] (1990).
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nature of human rights becomes universal. This understanding is the only solid foundation
for a civil society.
One of the fundamental questions presently facing Russia and other nation-states
formed on the ruins of the Communist empire is whether a direct transition from
totalitarianism to democracy is possible without going through an authoritarian stage. In
Germany, Italy, and Japan, this transition was direct but followed after a military defeat
and was facilitated by the assistance and active cooperation of the United States. The
countries of Eastern Europe also experienced the direct transition from totalitarian
communist regimes to democratic forms of government, even in countries with weak
democratic traditions, such as Bulgaria and Romania.
After August 1991, a scholarly debate about the necessity of a transitional
authoritarian stage moved onto a practical plane. The failure of the post-communist
leadership to stop the nation from sliding into economic and political chaos is increasingly
interpreted as an argument in favor of a "strong hand." Some scholars and politicians,
like the ex-mayor of Moscow, Gavriil Popov, argue that democracy was adequate for the
destruction of totalitarianism, but it is not fit for the task of social and economic
restructuring due to the absence of a truly democratic foundation.46 They conclude that
in the transitional period, the leaders of the executive branch should play the leading role.
The position is questionable, however, because the expansion of the executive branch
occurring after August 1991 was accompanied by an explosive growth of bureaucracy on
all levels of government. In the absence of a system of checks and balances on
government, this results in an imbalance which undermines the foundations of nascent
democracy.
Another persuasive criticism of the pro-authoritarian argument is skepticism about
whether a free market economy can be built by efforts "from the top" without the active
participation of the subjects of the economy. Real market reform cannot be carried out by
the simple "distribution of property" by government agencies. Instead, the government
needs to introduce time-tested economic regulations and necessary safeguards and then
step aside. Thus, movement toward a market economy would inevitably mean narrowing
the sphere of government domain and establishing a normal balance between the state and
the civic society emerging in the process of market-oriented restructuring.
Unlike European businesses that dealt only with weak states after the revolutions
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Russia's emerging businesses face a mighty
and antagonistic state machinery whose source of power is not only in the administrative
force but in the monopoly of state ownership. Instead of presenting new circumstances,
the lack of counterbalance to government power combined with the threat of authoritarian-
ism logically points to an extension of the Imperial-Soviet tradition.
Thus, the choice between democracy and authoritarianism is the choice between
slow and painful return to the mainstream of human civilization and a tragic movement
away from the road to democracy. The only way to democracy can be through democracy
itself, by gradual accumulation of its norms, habits, and attitudes.
In all successful revolutions, constitutional consolidation of the revolutionists'
achievements served as a prerequisite to further democratic development. In the
constitutional and legal vacuum remaining after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R.,
confusion reigns both in the republican centers and locally. Parliaments are claiming
powers beyond their authority. Governments are unable to tolerate the legal limits of their
authority. Finally, a growing army of presidents is eager to rule without hindrance.
46 Gavriil X. Popov, God Poste Avgusta [A Year After the August], IZVESTIYA, Aug. 1992, at 17, 19,
24, 26.
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If left without the protection of a constitution and detailed legislation, democratic
reforms dissipate or reverse. Further preservation of the outlived provisions of the 1977
Constitution can be used easily for counteracting the reforms, disputing the legality of
their results. Despite this, the Supreme Soviet of Russia for the second year has declined
consideration of a proposed constitution of Russia. Drafted by a group of democratic
deputies and progressive lawyers, these provisions are generally free from traditional
ideological cliches and would radically transform the social structure.47
For the first time in Russian history, a proposed constitution is based upon the idea of
social contract and people's sovereignty. More than 200 years after the great words, "We the
people..." were written in the preamble of the United States Constitution,48 they are repeated
by Russia's democrats in affirming the idea of the people as a sole source of sovereignty and
state power. The civilizational approach to the modem state-building secured in the constitutions
of all democratic countries is finally clear.
In the laws and constitutions of the Soviet period, the rights and freedoms of the
subjects were granted by the state according to the formula, "A citizen has a right
to .... " No one understood that the purpose of law is to protect human rights from
government infringement. Never before has a Soviet law ascended to the formula, "No
one has a fight to deprive an individual of the right to .... ." The proposed constitution
unequivocally prioritizes personal rights and freedoms over the general interest of society,
putting civic society over state.49
Why did the majority of democratically elected deputies prefer mending the old
Brezhnev Constitution to discussing the existing constitutional drafts? True - adoption
of the basic law of such a complex state as the Russian Federation calls for careful
elaboration of basic principles and complex procedures that will allow to coordinate
different interests of its units; it takes patience and time. And, most importantly, it takes
representatives of the people eager to act as a constitutional convention. Also, neither of
the several proposed constitutional drafts is ideal.50 They all have important deficiencies.
At the same time, at least three of them - the official, Sobchak's, and Shakhray's drafts
- represent an important step in the development of Russian constitutionalism. What is
the obstacle to making a final choice in favor of the civilizational principles of
constitutionalism that could become an integrating and stabilizing factor in a society with
an under-developed legal culture?
Having made a decisive choice between Communist totalitarianism and
democracy in August 1991, Russia's young democracy has not yet overcome the
Bolshevik syndrome in its own ranks. Revolution from the top has not been supported by
a revolution of overcoming ourselves. On the ruins of the collapsing paternalistic-
distributive, prohibitive-permissive ideology, we are still waiting for the ideology of a new
society to take hold. The purpose of government is to give each individual equal
opportunities for lawful self-realization and to refrain from limiting the individual in this
self-realization. Acceptance of this seemingly simple "ideology" is a major choice now
facing Russia's democracy.
7 PROEKT KONSTITUTSII RossIYSKoY FEDERATSII [DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION], Oct. 11, 1992 at 22.
41 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
49 PROEKT KONSTITUTSII RossIYSKoY FEDERATSII [DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION], Oct. 11, 1992 at 22.
" The official draft prepared by the Supreme Soviet's Constitutional Commission; Sobchak-Alekseev
draft (Sobchak, Mayor of St. Petersburg, Professor of Law, Alekseev, Professor of Law, ex-chairman of the
USST Supreme Soviet's Commission on Constitutionality); Shakhray's draft (Shakhray, close associate of
President Eltsyn, currently Minister of Nationalities) providing for a presidential republic with separation of
powers that is considered Eltsyn's inspired; and the communist draft.
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